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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Corey Young appeals following the district court’s order denying his motion for credit
for time served. Mr. Young asserts that the district court erred in denying him credit for prejudgment incarceration on two additional counts where the district court erroneously found
State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 6 (2015) (holding I.C. § 18-309 requires courts to credit a defendant
with prejudgment incarceration served on each count), was inapplicable to Mr. Young’s case as
such application would be retroactive. While the Owens Court noted that its holding would not
be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, Mr. Young’s motion for credit was made
through I.C.R. 35(c), which provides that such a motion can be made at any time. In that way,
an I.C.R. 35(c) motion is more ministerial, as it corrects a mathematical error in the judgment of
conviction. Where Mr. Young’s appeal of the district court’s denial of his motion for credit was
timely from the district court’s corrected order, the district court’s denial was error.1
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s erroneous contentions made in its
Respondent’s Brief. First, the State claims that Mr. Young’s notice of appeal was untimely
because the district court’s legal analysis and holding was the same in the original and the
corrected orders. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.4-6.) The State’s second assertion is that the district
court correctly applied the Idaho Supreme Court’s limitation on its holding in Owens to the facts

1

This issue was recently addressed in Mr. Young’s other case, in which the Idaho Court of
Appeals issued a decision, State v. Young, 2017 Opinion No. 1 (Ct. App. Jan.11, 2017).
However, this opinion is not yet final as a petition for review was filed by the appellant with the
Idaho Supreme Court on January 31, 2017, and a brief in support of that Petition was filed on
April 19, 2017. Should the Court grant review of the pending Petition, Mr. Young asks the
Court to also retain this case.
1

of Mr. Young’s case which prohibited Mr. Young from receiving credit on his motion for time
served. (Respondent’s Brief, p.6.)

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Young’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Young’s motion for credit for time served?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Young’s Motion For Credit For Time Served
The original December order was incorrect in that it referenced a different case and
decided the motion as it related to the facts of that case. Contrary to the State’s assertion, the
corrected order, filed July 21, 2016, was not a reissued or re-entered judgment and the nunc pro
tunc designation did not cause the corrected order to date back to December 23, 2016. Further,
the district court erred in finding the language of the Idaho Supreme Court in Owens prohibited
Mr. Young from receiving his requested relief as the language it relied on was dicta which
conflicted with the plain language of I.C. § 18-309 and I.C.R. 35(c).

A.

This Court Has Appellate Jurisdiction Because The Notice Of Appeal Was
Timely Filed From The Corrected Order

The State claims that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction (Respondent’s Brief, pp.7-8);
however, the claim is premised on a misunderstanding of the facts of Mr. Young’s case. The
State’s argument misunderstands the district court’s Corrected Order. (Respondent’s Brief, p.4.)
The Corrected Order did not simply “change[ ] the recitation of the procedural history of the case
. . . [and] include[ ] the same analysis and holding of its prior order.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.4.)
The State categorized the Corrected Order as simply a “re-entry” of the judgment, and based its
entire analysis on this erroneous premise. (Respondent’s Brief, p.5.) However, the district court
did not re-enter the original judgment. The order entered pertained to a different case; thus, the
entire December 23, 2015 order was incorrect—not just the procedural history, but also the
district court’s analysis of the basis for the motion for credit for time served. The district court’s
Corrected Order changed its initial finding that Mr. Young had requested an additional 282 days
of credit (94 days for each of the three counts not credited), and the July 21, 2016 order
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contained a modified conclusion as well, i.e., the district court’s holding that the court denied the
motion “as the relief he seeks cannot be obtained under State v. Owens.” (C.f., R., pp.149-150 to
R., pp.151-152.)
The district court entered its July 21, 2016 order “nunc pro tunc to December 23, 2015.”
(R., p.152.) Nunc pro tunc means means “now for then.” Westmont Tractor Co. v. Estate of
Westfall, 112 Idaho 712, 714 (1987) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition 1981).) The
district court’s “nunc pro tunc” designation was void.
In Westmont Tractor, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed whether a nunc pro tunc
judgment had been correctly entered. 112 Idaho at 714. The Court quoted language used by the
Idaho Court of Appeals in Ward v. Lupinacci, 111 Idaho 40, 43 (Ct. App. 1986) describing the
general requirements for a valid nunc pro tunc entry of judgment:
“It is widely held that such judgments may be entered in furtherance of justice
where failure to enter an earlier judgment was due to accident, excusable
oversight or mistake. [Citations omitted.] However, it also has been stated that a
judgment may not be given nunc pro tunc effect to correct a judicial error, as
opposed to a clerical error; neither may it contain a rule and recite an event that
did not actually occur.” [Citations omitted.] Ward, supra, at 42, 720 P.2d at 225.
Westmont Tractor, 112 Idaho at 714.
However, a court may not issue an order nunc pro tunc if doing so would prejudice a
party. Id., 112 Idaho at 714. The United States Supreme Court has held:
[W]here the delay in rendering a judgment or a decree arises from the act of the
court, ... the judgment or decree may be entered retrospectively, as of a time when
it should or might have been entered up.... [I]t is the duty of the court to see that
the parties shall not suffer by the delay. A nunc pro tunc order should be granted
or refused, as justice may require in view of the circumstances of the particular
case.
Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1881) (emphasis added); see also Ward v. Lupinacci,
111 Idaho 40, 43 (Ct. App. 1986).
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Here, the prejudice is clear—Mr. Young’s motion requesting 314 days of credit for time
served had not yet been ruled on, and the State could have challenged the propriety of the issue
appealed from a plainly incorrect order.

Thus, had Mr. Young tried to appeal from the

December 23, 2015 order, his appeal would have been confounded as Mr. Young would have
had to analyze the district court’s denial of his request for 282 days of credit, when he had
actually requested 314 days of credit, relating to his convictions in a different case. Due to this
prejudice, the district court’s nunc pro tunc designation was void.2

B.

The District Court Erred In Finding The Retroactivity Language In Owens
Precluded The Relief Sought In Mr. Young’s Motion For Credit For Time Served

The State claims that the relief requested by Mr. Young is directly contrary to the Idaho
Supreme Court’s Opinion in Owens. (Respondent’s Brief, p.7.) The State relies on the language
of Owens in which the Court limited its holding to “apply only ‘prospectively and to cases now
on direct review’” (Respondent’s Brief, p.8 (quoting Owens, 158 Idaho at 7)); however, the
retroactivity discussion in Owens was plainly dicta because in Mr. Owens’ case, the Court
granted him relief despite the fact that his motion for credit was not filed until five months after
the Judgment of Conviction was entered. The district court erred in denying Mr. Young’s
motion to correct the credit for time served computation so that it was consistent with the plain
language of the statute.
In State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court overruled State v. Hoch,
102 Idaho 351 (1981), and held that the statute mandates the court credit a defendant “for time
served on each of his offenses, whether to be served concurrently or consecutively.” Id. at 4.

2

See Cook v. Arias, No. 41745, 2015 WL 4133726, at *5 (Idaho Feb. 6, 2015) (holding “[t]he
attempt to make the partial judgment retroactive is void.”)
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The Court found that courts had been erroneously interpreting I.C. § 18-309 since 1981, but it
corrected the previous error by overruling wrongly decided precedent and awarding the proper
credit to Mr. Owens. Id. at 3-5.
The Court went on to analyze when the corrected interpretation of I.C. § 18-309 would be
applied. The Court found:
The threshold question in applying the Teague test is whether a case announces a
new rule. See State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 505 (Wyo. 2014). Generally a case
announces a new rule “when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation”
on states. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070, 103 L.Ed.2d at 349. In
other words, “a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.” Id.
(emphasis in original). We have never before interpreted Idaho Code section 18–
309 as adding credit for time served to each consecutive count in a judgment.
Because we are now interpreting section 18–309 in a way that was not dictated by
precedent, this case announces a new rule.
Id. at 6. The Owens Court stated that it would apply its new interpretation of the plain language
of I.C. § 18-309 “only prospectively and to cases now on direct review.” Id. at 7. In fact, as
Mr. Young pointed out in his Appellant’s Brief, the retroactivity analysis is dicta as the Court
addressed Mr. Owens’ assertion of error despite the fact that he was five months past the time
from which to appeal his Judgment. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-12.)
However, this Court is not bound by dicta in a prior decision. City of Weippe for Use &
Benefit of Les Schwab Tire Centers of Idaho, Inc. v. Yarno, 96 Idaho 319, 323 (1974). Judicial
opinions are only authoritative on the facts on which they are based: “There is a pronounced line
of demarcation between what is said in an opinion and what is decided by it.” Bashore v. Adolf,
41 Idaho 84, __, 238 P.534, 534 (1925) (quoting State v. City of St. Louis, 145 S.W. 801, 803
(Mo. 1912) (emphasis in original)). The retroactivity admonishment amounts to mere dicta,
which cannot be relied upon as binding precedent. See Shrives v. Talbot, 91 Idaho 338, 346
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(1966) (dicta cannot be relied upon as binding precedent). Further, the Owens dicta is contrary
to the holding in Owens and the plain language of both I.C. § 18-309 and I.C.R. 35(c).
Like the defendant in Owens, Mr. Young timely appealed from the denial of his motion
for credit for time served. Further, his motion for credit for time served was made in December
of 2015, after the Idaho Supreme Court decided Owens. (R., pp.138-139.)
The correct application of I.C. § 18-309 requires the district court to consider the law in
effect at the time it considers and decides the motion for credit for time served. At the time the
district court was asked to calculate Mr. Young’s credit for time served, Owens was in effect.
(R., pp.138-139.) The Owens Court held that the credit for time served statute, I.C. § 18-309, is
not ambiguous. Owens, 158 Idaho at 4. The plain language of I.C. § 18-309, in its common and
ordinary meaning, does not restrict a credit calculation to only be performed at the time the
judgment is actually entered. The language “is entered or imposed” is not mandating when the
defendant’s credit can be calculated or given, but is describing who receives the credit. The
plain meaning of the word “when” as used in section 18-309 means, “at the time of.” Thus, the
Idaho Criminal Rule allowing a motion to be made for a credit calculation at any time is both
necessary and consistent. As such, I.C.R. 35(c) and I.C. § 18-309 can be read in harmony.
Additionally, the Idaho Legislature did not include a cut-off date for the courts in
determining credit for time served. While the Legislature certainly knew of the broad language
of I.C.R. 35(c) (allowing a motion for credit for time served to “be made at any time”) and knew
how to draft language specifying the date a defendant/appellant’s conviction will be covered by
the statute (See, i.e., I.C. § 19-870(a) (requiring the state appellate public defender to provide
representation to appellants “convicted on or after September 1, 1998”), it did not do so. Instead,

8

the Legislature enacted statutory amendments broadening the circumstances in which courts
“shall” give credit for “any time served.” See I.C. §§ 18-309(2), 19-2603.
Therefore, the dicta in Owens essentially requires the district court to apply an improper
calculation of credit due based on when the judgment was entered and became final. Further, its
application would be error in that it would place an additional condition on Mr. Young, a
condition not applied to Mr. Owens, but one that determined that the time in which the initial
judgment of conviction was final was the cut-off point, such that proper application of the plain
language of the statute could be ignored. The district court erred in finding the retroactivity
language in Owens prevented it from granting Mr. Young his credit for time served on all three
of his counts.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Young respectfully requests that this Court order that
he be given additional credit for time served in the amount of 314 days.
DATED this 19th day of May, 2017.

_________/s/________________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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